I couldn't quite figure out where Dave was mistaken with his "market failure" analogy - instinctively it didn't feel right. Twitter's market is selling customer data and attention to advertisers and as long as the a) platform is up b) eyes are peeled to the feed, the market is working[1]; i.e. they don't need better security.

What we are facing however is a "policy market failure", meaning that Internet users want better privacy on social media platforms[2], but the vendors don't deliver it. This is a little bit similar to seatbelts in cars.  Manufacturers tried to offer seatbelts but were faced with resistance in the market (analogy - more secure social media) despite experts agreeing that it's a good thing. Unlike social media where choice is largely individual, if you need to get from point A to point B you probably need to get into a car and as a passenger you don't have much choice. 

So, the policy market failure here is that those who sell policy - elected officials are unable to sell it to the public, majority of whom don't care but the disproporitionaly affeted minority - those whom Indian govt wanted to spy on can't afford.

The privatized utilities security issue can be solved quite effectively by demanding that they carry a specific type of (cyber) insurance or they have to have it back to govt. Insurers as of 2022 have developed a decent "cyber fire code". The caveat here, and its not  a small one, is if private utility companies then pass these costs onto the consumers.  Insurers won't write companies that are garbage. We'd have to work out some kind of adjustment formula for security dereliction (your annual spend on security should have been X, it was Y where Y<X, therefore you can't pass these costs onto consumers if you made profits those years)

[1] You could argue that there's also the barter of customers give their time in exchange for advertisement.
[2] You could argue that if they want more privacy they can move to chat groups on Signal or IRC over Tor, but we all know that social media works when there's a critical mass which is the story about all these high valuations on businesses that either lose money or just about break even like Twitter.

On Wed, 24 Aug 2022, at 21:38, Dave Aitel via Dailydave wrote:
If you were at a talk at Defcon this year in the Policy track, you probably heard someone talk about how they, as a government official, are there to address "market failures". And immediately you thought: This is a load of nonsense. 

Because that government official is not allowed to, and has no intentions of, addressing any market failures whatsoever. If the Government was going to address market failures, they'd have to find some way to convince every cloud provider from making their security features the upsell on the Platinum package. They'd have to talk about how trying to get into different markets means every social media company faces huge pressures to put Indian spies on their network. 

Obviously you know, as someone who did not emerge from under a rock into the security community yesterday, that the answer to having a malicious insider on your network is probably some smart segmentation, which we call "Zero Trust" now. 

But Zero Trust is expensive! And most social media companies are not exactly profitable as the great monster known as TikTok has eaten every eyeball in every market because the very concept of having people explicitly choose who their friends are is outdated now. 

In fact, as everyone is pointing out, almost all companies you know are in this position! They're cutting costs by sending jobs overseas while spending huge amounts of money propping up their stock prices and paying their executives to sell them to a dwindling market of buyers. Private Equity companies spend every effort on squeezing the last dollar out of old enterprise software by exploiting the lock-in they have on small businesses. 

And as critical as Twitter is, we have the exact same dynamic with our privatized water and power companies - who have no plans to make strategic investments in security or anything really - which is why on public calls you can hear them humiliating themselves asking Jen Easterly to absorb the entire costs of their security programs. 

The ideal practice for all of these companies is to offload their costs onto the taxpayer, which is why instead of investing in security, they cry for the FBI to go collect their bitcoin from whatever ransomware crews are on their network this week using offensive cyber operations that themselves cost the government an order of magnitude more than the bitcoin is worth.

As you're sitting in that Defcon talk, listening to someone from government talk about how they only want to regulate with the "input of industry" or something, you have to wonder: if this is every company we know, maybe the market failure isn't just how hard it is to buy a good security product because they all abuse the copyright system to avoid any kind of performance transparency. Maybe it's also how hard it is to SELL a good security product because every single company is trying to cut their budget to the exact minimum amount that will allow them to tell the FBI they did their best, and the FBI needs to go out there and pick up their slack.  

-dave

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