- Dailydave - mm4.emwd.com

Yawps from the rooftops
by Dave Aitel 05 Jun '23

05 Jun '23

[image: image.png]https://twitter.com/thezdi/status/1638617627626176513 [image: image.png] Yawps So one thing I have as a "lessons learned" from the past 20 years is that security is not a proactive sport. In fact, we are all experts at running to where the ball _was_as opposed to where it is _going_. Like, if you listen to Risky Biz this week, Patrick asks Metlstorm whether it's time to go out and replace all the old enterprise file sharing systems <https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1641629743534559233?s=20> you have around, proactively. And the answer, from Metl, who's hacked into every org in Oceania for the past 20 years, is "yeah, this is generating huge return on investment for the ransomware crews so they're just going to keep doing it, and being proactive might be a great idea." But what he didn't say, but clearly had in his head was "but lol, nobody is going to actually do that. So good luck out there chooms!" At some level, STIX and TAXII and the whole CTI market are about passing around information on what someone _might_ have used to hack something, at some point in the _distant past_. It's a paleontology of hackers past - XML schemas about huge ancient reptiles swimming in the tropical seas of your networks, the taxonomies of extinct orders we now know only through a delicate finger-like flipper bone or a clever piece of shellcode. -dave

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Fussing about with fuzzers
by Dave Aitel 22 May '23

22 May '23

So last week at offensivecon I watched a talk on Fuzzilli ( https://github.com/googleprojectzero/fuzzilli) which, I have to admit I had no idea what it was. Obviously I knew it was a Googlely Javascript fuzzer, finding bugs. But I did not realize that it was applying mutations to its own intermediate language which it then compiled to Javascript. I just assumed it was, like most fuzzers, mutating the javascript directly (f.e. https://sean.heelan.io/2016/04/26/fuzzing-language-interpreters-using-regre… ). But having an IL designed for fuzzing-related mutations is clearly a great idea! And this year, they've expanded on that to build a Javascript->Fuzzilli compiler/translation layer. So you can pass in sample Javascript and then it will create the IL and then it will mutate the IL. The reason this is necessary is that Javascript is. like almost all modern languages, extremely complicated underneath the covers, so in order to generate crashes you may need to have a lot of different fields set properly in a particular order in a structure. They try to do some introspection on objects and generate their samples from that as well, but there's no beating "real user code" for learning how an object needs to be created and used. These advances generate a lot more bugs! In theory none of these bugs matter in the future because of the mitigations (no pointers outside the Javascript gigacage!) going into place by the very authors of the fuzzer? (I have my doubts, but we all will live and learn?) It would be...very cool, I think, if Bard or another LLM was the one doing the Javascript sample generation as well. If you think about it, these LLMs all have a good understanding of Javascript and you can give them various weird tasks to do, and let them generate your samples, and then when a crash happens you can have them mutate around that crash, or if you have a sample not getting any more code coverage you can have them mutate that sample to attempt to make it weirder. :) -dave

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Knowledge Graph + AI = ?
by Dave Aitel 09 May '23

09 May '23

*Logical Operations on Knowledge Graphs:* So if you've spent enough time looking at graph databases, you will invariably run into people who are obsessed with "ontologies". The basic theory being that if you've already organized your data in some sort of directed graph, maybe you can then apply a logical ruleset to those relationships and infer knowledge about things you didn't already know, which could be useful? There are a lot of people trying to do this with SBOMs and I...wish them the best. In real life I think it's basically impossible to create a large, useful, graph database+inference engine that has data clean enough for anything useful. Also the word *ontology* is itself very annoying. But philosophically, while any complex enough data set will have to embrace paradoxes, you can get a lot of value out of putting some higher level structure based on the text in your data. And this is where modern AI comes in - in specific, the tree of "Natural Language Understanding" that broke off from Chomsky-esque-and-wrong "Natural Language Processing" some time ago. One article covering this topic is here <https://medium.com/@anthony.mensier/gpt-4-for-defense-specific-named-entity…>, which combines entity extraction and classification in order to look into finding military topics in an article. But these techniques can be abstracted and broadened as a general purpose and very useful algorithm: Essentially you want to extract keywords from text fields within your graph data, then relate those keywords to each other, which gives you conceptual groupings and allows you to make further queries that uncover insights about those groups. *Our Solution:* One of the team-members over at Margin Research working on SocialCyber <https://www.darpa.mil/program/hybrid-ai-to-protect-integrity-of-open-source…> with me, Matt Filbert, came up with the idea of using OpenAI's GPT to get hashtags from text, which it does very very well. If you store these as nodes you get something like the picture below (note that hashtags are BASED on the text, but they are NOT keywords and may not be in the text itself): [image: image.png] Next you want to figure out how topics are related to each other! Which you can do in a thousand different ways - the code words to search on are "Node Similarity" - but almost all those ways will either not work or create bad results because you have a very limited directional graph of just "Things->Topics". In the end we used a modified Jaccardian algo (aka, you are similar if you have shared parents), which I call Daccardian because it creates weighted directed graphs (which comes in handy later): [image: image.png] So once you've done that, you get this kind of directed graph: [image: image.png] From here you could build communities of related topics using any community detection algorithm, but even just being able to query against them is extremely useful. In theory you could query just against one topic at a time, but because of the way your data is probably structured, you want both that topic, and any closely related topics to be included. So for example, looking for Repos that have topics that either are "#UI" or closely related, can be queried like this (not all topics are shown because of the LIMIT clause): [image: image.png] *Some notes on AI Models:* OpenAI's APIs are a bit slow, and often throw errors randomly, which is fun to handle. And of course, when doing massive amounts of inference, it's probably cheaper to run your own equipment, which will leave you casting about on Huggingface like a glow worm in a dark cave for a model that can do this and is open source. I've tried basically all of them and they've all started out promising but then been a lot worse than ChatGPT 3.5. You do want one that is multilingual, and Bard might be an option when they open their API access up. There's a significant difference between the results from the big models and the little ones, in contrast to the paper that just "leaked" from Google <https://www.semianalysis.com/p/google-we-have-no-moat-and-neither> about how small tuned models are going to be just as good as bigger models (which they are not!). One minor exception is the new Mosaic model ( https://huggingface.co/spaces/mosaicml/mpt-7b-instruct) which is multilingual and four times cheaper than OpenAI but it's also about 1/4th as good. It may be the first "semi-workable" open model though, which is a promising sign and it may be worth moving to this if you have data you can't run through an open API for some reason. *Conclusion:* If you have a big pile of structured data, you almost certainly have natural language data that you want to capture as PART of that structure, but this would have been literally impossible six months ago before LLMs. Using this AI-tagging technique and doing some basic graph algorithms can really open up the power of your queries to take the most valuable part of your information into account, while not losing the performance and scalability of having it in a database in the first place. Thanks for reading, Dave Aitel PS: I have a dream, and that dream is to convert Ghidra into a Graph Database as a native format so we can use some of these techniques (and code embeddings) as a native feature. If you sit next to the Ghirda team, and you read this whole post, give them a poke for me. :)

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Performance thoughts
by Dave Aitel 28 Apr '23

28 Apr '23

So my first thought is that performance measurement tools seem exactly aimed at a lot of security problems but performance people are extremely reluctant <https://aus.social/@brendangregg/110276319669838295> to admit that because of the drama involved in the security market. Which is very smart of them! :) Secondly, I wanted to re-link to Halvar's QCon keynote <https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1wOT5kOWkQybVTHzB7uLXpU39ctYzXpOs2xV…>. He has a section on the difficulties of getting good performance benchmarks, which typically you would do as part of your build chain. So in theory, you have a lot of compilation features you can twiddle when compiling and you want to change those values, compile your program, and get a number for how fast it is. But this turns out to basically be impossible in the real world for reasons I'll let him explain in his presentation (see below). [image: image.png] A lot of these problems with performance seem only solvable by a continuous process of evolutionary algorithms - where you have a population of different compilation variables, and you probably introduce new ones over time, and you kill off the cloud VMs where you're getting terrible performance under real-world situations and let the ones getting good or average performance thrive. I'm sure this is being done, and probably if I listened to more of Dino dai Zovi's talks I'd know where and how, but aside from having performance implications, it also has security implications because it will tend towards offering offensive implants value for becoming less parasitic and more symbiotic. -dave

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LSU is hiring CS Professors with RE and binary exploitation experience
by Andrew Case 30 Mar '23

30 Mar '23

The Computer Science department at Louisiana State University (LSU) is currently hiring for many faculty positions related to applied cyber security. Courses taught inside this department include reverse engineering, malware analysis, binary exploitation, memory forensics and other intensive courses related to incident response and offensive security. Ideal candidates will have significant experience with deeply technical areas of cybersecurity. LSU was recently granted the CAE-CO designation and is one of only 21 schools nation-wide to hold it as it is the most technical designation granted by NSA and DHS. The department also runs a large SFS program for cyber security students. If you are interested in one of these positions, then please see the following link. I also ask my industry contacts to please spread the word within academic communities that you have access to: https://lsu.wd1.myworkdayjobs.com/en-US/LSU/job/3325-Patrick-F-Taylor-Hall/… The cybersecurity effort at LSU has strong support from the highest levels of the school and is rapidly expanding – so now is the perfect time to join. PS: I am not employed by LSU, but do work very closely with the CS department to ensure the courses are relevant to industry and rigorous enough for students to leave with real-world, hands-on experience. If you have questions related to the position, then please direct them to Dr. Golden Richard at LSU: https://www.cct.lsu.edu/~golden/ Thanks, Andrew

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t2'23: Call For Papers 2023 (Helsinki, Finland)
by Tomi Tuominen 12 Feb '23

12 Feb '23

Call For Papers 2023 Tired of your bosses suspecting conference trips to exotic locations being just a ploy to partake in Security Vacation Club? Prove them wrong by coming to Helsinki, Finland on May 4-5 2023! Guaranteed lack of sunburn, good potential for rain or slush. In case of great spring weather, though, no money back. CFP and registration both open. Read further if still unsure. Maui, Miami, Las Vegas, Tel Aviv or Wellington feel so much sunnier once you’ve experienced the lack of infinity pools in Northern Europe. Instead of pools and palms trees, we can offer you actual saunas and a high tech environment, which is a weird combination of demoscene, widespread Linux adoption, mobile Internet with uncapped flat rate data and a long history of IRC and imageboards. What defines a conference? For t2 it has always been that intimate welcoming atmosphere of a small event, which makes both audience and speakers approachable. There are enough regulars to create the feeling of a community, but not too many that a first-comer would feel being left out. On the content side, we have always been and always will be a technical security conference, emphasizing the cutting edge, world class research. This is an event for the community. Our focus[1] is on technical excellence, not politics or player hating. t2’23 offers you an audience with a taste for technical security presentations containing original content. This is your chance to showcase the latest research and lessons in EDR simulation and healthcheck spoofing, hardware insecurity, inferring information from interference, cloud-scale forensics or persistance automation, new vulnerability classes, AI exploitation, virtual machines inside parsers, elegant exploitation of old vulnerability classes, modern defense, dropping zero days during presentations, state of the art memory corruption mitigation bypasses, evasions, safe cracking, satellite and space security, remote vehicle access, or whatever research lights up the eyes of seasoned conference visitors. For the hackers by the hackers. The advisory board will be reviewing submissions until 2023-03-17. Slide deck submission final deadline 2023-04-20 for accepted talks. First come, first served. Submissions will not be returned. Quick facts for speakers + presentation length 60-120 minutes, in English + complimentary travel and accommodation for one person[6] + decent speaker hospitality benefits + no marketing or product propaganda Still not sure if this is for you? Check out the blast from the past[2]. The total amount of attendees, including speakers and organizers is limited to 99. Advisory Board recognize[3] the OG Finnish sauna culture is an acquired taste and can promise the lack of sweaty, partially or fully nude sauna-goers at all conference functions. [0] hunter2 [1] https://t2.fi/about/eula/ [2] https://t2.fi/schedules/ [3] https://youtu.be/Oj8JBBAM5jY?t=40 [6] except literally @nudehaberdasher and @0xcharlie How to submit Fill out the form at https://if.t2.fi/action/cfp How to register Buy your ticket at https://t2.fi/registration/

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Chapter 2
by Dave Aitel 04 Sep '22

04 Sep '22

(Note, this is a continuation of our previous story chapter since sometimes it's more fun to read fiction than to wonder what's going on these days with Cloudflare or whatever. https://lists.aitelfoundation.org/archives/list/dailydave@lists.aitelfounda… ) Chapter 2 _________________________________________________ Landing in Miami is like visiting a tier of hell just below Limbo. It is not saturated in evil so much as the established gateway to more evil places. As you disembark from your flight you can almost see a direct line from providing no-questions-asked banking to drug dealers in the eighties, to offering an endless series of apartments (aka money hiding spots) to the Venezualan upper class, to the current endless series of crypto companies headquartered in the newly hip Brickle office spaces next to SmileDirect and fancy brew pubs. In the sense that NYC deals in finances, San Francisco in software companies, Boston in "higher education", Miami is more about your more generic small-scale scams as the underlying substrate upon which the rest of the economy is based. The tropics engender a sort of flexibility and adaptability which is about finding new scam-niches and exploiting them before anyone else has caught on. But your meeting here is not about crypto-coin or real estate built with permeable concrete guaranteed to spall in the face of salt-water-laden winds. It's with a company building testing software of all things. "Boring is rewarding" you say to yourself, as you drive past a literal graveyard to a small joint called "Hush" which you give an approving nod to. Hush serves fried alligator, which tastes like fried anything, as you sit across from your lunch companions, Stewart and Amy. They are drinking beers you've never heard of, and they lay out their scheme, without regard to OPSEC since nobody in this restaurant other than you would likely understand it. "We've been building a large set of unit testing libraries for cryptographic primitives, lots of complicated string building stuff, machine learning, you name it." "Great." You say. "Always good to have quality testing libraries". But they exchange a look and you realize you've misinterpreted them. "Our public libraries have a tendency to ... sometimes think things are very well written and secure when they are ... not. It's just sometimes our unit testing has bugs, you know? We have really good documentation in a lot of languages though. And great support. 24/7. Discord, Slack, forums, you name it." "So the theory here is you don't target any particular software in the supply chain? You just encourage bad testing practices?" You're pondering their value, while at the same time trying to think about what alligator actually tastes like under all the grease. The flavor, as far as you can determine, is "Chewy". Stewart struggles for a second to get the words out, like a huge machine optimized for literally anything other than the current task of explaining things to other humans using words. "Sometimes it's best when the check to see if ASLR is enabled doesn't actually work, so your bugs that you find have a chance to be exploitable. We're not in the business of putting bugs in things. We just make the bugs you do have....better." "I see. What about code we actually want to be secure?" "I recommend everyone local uses our FIPS certified library, which, admittedly, is expensive and does the same thing as our free code, but maybe with more effort put into the actual tests themselves." Amy says this to you without any hint of chicanery, as if this is a simple fact, almost not worth saying. It is, you realise, a very tropical CONOP. "I will make sure this is required by various regulations after you are funded. I'll have my team send you the paperwork." you say. And with that, the conversation moves to pleasant nonsense as you internally contemplate your next flight - out of here and into the cold. -dave

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"Market Failures"
by Dave Aitel 25 Aug '22

25 Aug '22

If you were at a talk at Defcon this year in the Policy track, you probably heard someone talk about how they, as a government official, are there to address "market failures". And immediately you thought: This is a load of nonsense. Because that government official is not allowed to, and has no intentions of, addressing any market failures whatsoever. If the Government was going to address market failures, they'd have to find some way to convince every cloud provider from making their security features the upsell on the Platinum package. They'd have to talk about how trying to get into different markets means every social media company faces huge pressures to put Indian spies on their network. Obviously you know, as someone who did not emerge from under a rock into the security community yesterday, that the answer to having a malicious insider on your network is probably some smart segmentation, which we call "Zero Trust" now. But Zero Trust is expensive! And most social media companies are not exactly profitable as the great monster known as TikTok has eaten every eyeball in every market because the very concept of having people explicitly choose who their friends are is outdated now. In fact, as everyone is pointing out, almost all companies you know are in this position! They're cutting costs by sending jobs overseas while spending huge amounts of money propping up their stock prices and paying their executives to sell them to a dwindling market of buyers. Private Equity companies spend every effort on squeezing the last dollar out of old enterprise software by exploiting the lock-in they have on small businesses. And as critical as Twitter is, we have the exact same dynamic with our privatized water and power companies - who have no plans to make strategic investments in security or anything really - which is why on public calls you can hear them humiliating themselves asking Jen Easterly to absorb the entire costs of their security programs. The ideal practice for all of these companies is to offload their costs onto the taxpayer, which is why instead of investing in security, they cry for the FBI to go collect their bitcoin from whatever ransomware crews are on their network this week using offensive cyber operations that themselves cost the government an order of magnitude more than the bitcoin is worth. As you're sitting in that Defcon talk, listening to someone from government talk about how they only want to regulate with the "input of industry" or something, you have to wonder: if this is every company we know, maybe the market failure isn't just how hard it is to buy a good security product because they all abuse the copyright system to avoid any kind of performance transparency. Maybe it's also how hard it is to SELL a good security product because every single company is trying to cut their budget to the exact minimum amount that will allow them to tell the FBI they did their best, and the FBI needs to go out there and pick up their slack. -dave

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Defcon 30
by Dave Aitel 23 Aug '22

23 Aug '22

As you wander the halls of the inaptly named Caesar's Forum, amidst a living sea of the most neurodiverse Clan humanity has ever seen, you cannot help but stop for a second to close your eyes amidst the cacophony and mentally exclaim, "Look. Look at the world we have created!" Sitting in the one cafe in the Paris hotel with food, a tattooed thirty-something who has been to Defcon twice gives you advice on how to do the conference. "Take the unirail." they say. "Also, you should have a hacker name! Mine is 'youngblood''" "Noted!" you respond. These are good ideas. The unirail in particular, probably, because Vegas is overflowing - and decent food options and anywhere to sit that is not beeping at you or showing grungy dystopian TV ads the Cyberpunk 2077 developers would find over-the-top are impossible to come by, making the conference ten times more exhausting than usual. In that sense, you miss the Alexis Park days, sitting with Halvar Flake next to a pool where everyone was more larval than they knew, watching Dildog lauch BO2K to a thousand screaming fans in the same room Dino Dai Zovi explained Solaris hacking an hour earlier. Some of the best talks this year had no attendees at all - Orange Tsai's talk was over Zoom, to a huge room, but with few butts in the seats. There were a hundred "Villages" it seemed like, living a half-life between physical space in the conference room and a Discord channel. Defcon may be the worst and best place to learn anything in that way - the environment is hopelessly chaotic, with two talks happening inches away from each other, and only feet from a DJ pumping out house music. But perhaps the best environment to learn in is the one in which you are most inspired? My friends, we've conquered the world. What's next? -dave

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Phase changes in international relations
by Dave Aitel 22 Aug '22

22 Aug '22

Right now, there is a, to put it mildly, ongoing discussion between proponents of coercion and deterrence in cyber policy, and adherents of a new theory, called *persistent engagement.* Maybe the sum total of the people in the argument is less than a thousand, but as academic circles go, it heavily influences the US Defense Department and IC, and through that, the rest of the world, so it is fun to watch. Also obviously it has added to infosec Twitter drama, which of course is the most important thing in the whole Universe. But while I try to keep this list technical, I wanted to put it into context for people here, so they can better appreciate the Twitter drama. But before I do that, I want to talk about a Defcon talk I attended. I'm not going to say WHICH talk, since it was under Chatham House Rule, but it was about cyber policy. When I pressed someone on an aspect of their policy efforts and how it implicated technical experts without involving their feedback (export control around penetration testing tools) they said "Well, that was more an expression of our country's VALUES and so we didn't need to listen to our technical experts". And I thought that was very interesting! Because the technical community is highly connected and paying attention to these sorts of things in a way that didn't used to be the case. If your message on one issue is going to be "When our values and the technical community's values don't align, we don't bother listening to them" then they will all know immediately, and all your other outreach efforts might as well be wasted air. And this is true across the board - disintermediation via cyber is now a universal truth. I believe you can come at the theories of persistent engagement by looking at it from a different perspective: Instead of saying "Here's a bunch of data about what we see in cyber, and it looks a certain way, and that way requires a new way of thinking" you ask yourself whether the fundamental way of dealing with conflict in international relations literature can be simplified down to coercion and deterrence when the system is a highly connected network. In other words, the game theory math you would use for dyads and bilateral relationships is great for looking at nuclear conflict because that's how the problem is presented, but doesn't scale to the problems we have for cyber conflicts, which are about emergent effects of much more complicated systems. That's why it's not just different, but downright wrong, to talk about offense-defense balances when we look at cyber or cyber-enabled conflicts. It's why the previous international relations work on deterrence and coercion just doesn't apply cleanly, if at all. On one side (the wrong side) you have people saying "Cyber is not strategic because it cannot hold ground like infantry can!" and on the other side you have people building international relations theories based on cycles of attack, on responses and counter-responses to aggression in the cyber domain because you can lead an entire country around by the nose ring that is TikTok. At some level, we are going to have to stop talking about offensive cyber operations as a corollary of SIGINT capability, and going to look more holistically at COGINT. To sum it up: Complexity in connectivity introduces phase changes in systems. We now live in a highly connected world, and this means we need new paradigms of international relations, whether you are under Chatham House Rule or not. -dave

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